Neuro-psychological Differences in Distress and Conflict

In this line of research, with Dr. McGregor (University of Waterloo), Dr. Michael Inzlicht (University of Toronto), and Dr. Jacob Hirsh (University of Toronto – Rotman School of Management), we examine individual differences associated with distress and conflict. In one set of studies, based on the idea that approach motivation can shield from distress, we focused on trait approach motivation. We found that a specific pattern of brain activity characteristic of trait approach motivation was negatively correlated with the error-related negativity (ERN), an event-related potential elicited by error commission (Nash, McGregor, & Inzlicht, 2012, Biological Psychology). In a separate study, we focused on attachment security. Compared to insecure individuals, securely attached individuals have shown less distress to conflict and less defensive responding in prior research, suggesting that secure people are better at regulating conflict. In a pre-post design, we found that secure and insecure individuals initially had similar ERN amplitudes before a distressing experience. After the distressing experience (thinking about personal anxieties), however, insecure individuals displayed a heightened ERN whereas secure individuals showed a stable ERN (Nash et al., 2014, Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience). Notably, the ERN has been source-localized to the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC); a brain area sensitive to conflict that activates regulatory processes.

In a recent follow-up study, participants were randomly assigned to an experimental manipulation of achievement-related distress or a low-distress control condition. After, participants listened passively to an auditory oddball involving frequent simple tones and infrequent white noise stimuli as EEG was recorded. We found that secure individuals demonstrated a muted P300 to white noise after the distressing condition, compared to the control condition, indicative of reduced attention to aversive stimuli. Additionally, secure individuals showed a startle-specific increase in left frontal asymmetry in the distress condition, a neural marker of approach motivation, and this increase in approach-related brain activity was associated with a reduced P300. These results shed light on the neural mechanisms of affect regulation amongst secure individuals and suggest that they flexibly adopt an approach motivation mind-set to mute reactions to aversive stimuli, particularly after distressing events.

Basic differences in distress and conflict can have broad implications. For example, with Dr. Daria Knoch (University of Bern), we examined neuroanatomical differences in the ACC (using MRI) and moral convictions. Group-focused moral convictions pertain to valuing group welfare over individual welfare. Such convictions sharply divide both conservatives from liberals and the religiously devout from non-believers. We found that increased adherence to group-focused moral convictions was associated with reduced grey matter in the ACC. Because reduced ACC volume has been reliably associated with limited conflict regulation ability, these findings support the idea that group-focused moral convictions reflect a kind of motivated social cognition and may help compensate for reduced capacity to regulate distress and conflict.(Nash*, Baumgartner*, Hill, & Knoch, 2017; *shared first authorship).

Decision-Making and Self-Control

In this line of research, we examine the neural mechanisms of self-regulation in social decision-making. Research demonstrates that the prefrontal cortex (PFC, particularly the lateral PFC) is involved in implementing self-control in decision-making and conflict regulation. We found that dispositional activity in the lateral PFC region is also associated with motor-control, a low-level type of self-control (Schiller, Gianotti, Nash, & Knoch, 2013, Cerebral Cortex). We next sought to provide evidence that directly links motor-control to self-control in social decision-making, a more complex kind of self-control. We found that electrophysiological indices of motor-control and brain activation source localized to the lateral PFC during motor-control predicted better self-control in an economic trust game administered several weeks later. Essentially, people who were better at controlling finger movements were also better at implementing self-control in a complex social context. This provides some of the first direct evidence that individual differences in motor and social self-control involve a common mechanism (Nash, Schiller, Gianotti, Baumgartner, & Knoch, 2013, PLoS ONE).

We also examined how self-control capacity relates to different types of social behaviors. In one study, participants played two economic games (i.e., the dictator game and the ultimatum game). Four unique groups were found based on behavior. One group was strongly-strategic, another weakly-strategic. A third group was altruistic. The final group was impulsive. Using the same electrophysiological index of self-control (i.e., lateral PFC activity during motor control), we found that both strongly-strategic and prosocial people had greater control capacity, compared to the weakly-strategic and the impulsive groups. Currently, intense debate surrounds whether strategic or prosocial people possess superior self-control. These findings support an integrative view (Gianotti*, Nash*, Schiller, Baumgartner, & Knoch, 2018, Scientific Reports, *shared first authorship).

Intergroup Behavior

In this line of research, with Dr. Knoch, we examine intergroup behavior, with a focus on intergroup bias. For example, we recently investigated individual differences in intergroup bias by indexing white matter connectivity (with diffusion tensor imaging). We hypothesized that better connectivity in the mentalizing system—a brain network related to perspective taking and empathy—would be associated with reduced intergroup bias. Participants viewed intergroup cooperation or exploitation between ingroup and outgroup members and were given the opportunity to punish exploitation, but at a personal cost (i.e., third party punishment). We found that white matter connectivity between mentalizing brain regions was positively correlated with reduced biased punishment of outgroup members. These findings suggest that mentalizing capacity can help explain individual differences in intergroup bias (Baumgartner*, Nash*, Hill, & Knoch, 2015, Neuroimage; *shared first authorship).

In a related publication, (Schiller, Giannoti, Baumgartner, Nash, Koenig, & Knoch, 2015, PNAS), we harnessed an EEG technique named ‘microstates analysis’ in an attempt to better probe the ‘black box’ of neuropsychological processes in the widely-used Implicit Associations Test (IAT), a measure of implicit attitudes including bias or prejudice. Microstate analysis, in conjunction with source localization (sLORETA), was used to sequence and locate in the brain separate neurophysiological processes from stimulus presentation to button press (contrast this method with traditional ERP analysis, which discards most of these data, and fMRI analysis, which does not have the temporal resolution for such fine grained sequencing). We found that congruent and incongruent trials in the IAT have the exact same sequence of processes. Interestingly, a response selection process in incongruent trials took longer than the same response selection process in congruent trials. These findings had direct relevance for interpretation of the IAT, a hotly contested area. More importantly, however, this study demonstrated the power of this analysis technique. In future research, we can open other ‘black boxes’ in any reaction time task, e.g., Stroop, Go-NoGo, Stop-signal, the Shooter task, etc. to better probe underlying processes.

Defensive Reactions

With Dr. Ian McGregor, we sought to demonstrate that certain defensive reactions might reflect an approach-motivated attempt to regulate the distress induced by goal conflict. For example, in one program of research we focused on intense ideological and religious convictions. We found that the same experiences of goal-conflict that caused approach motivation reactions also caused increased ideological and religious conviction (McGregor, Nash, & Prentice, 2010, JPSP). These reactions were most pronounced among approach-motivated individuals and those who felt more distressed by the goal-conflict. In two EEG studies, religious conviction was associated with decreased anxiety to conflict, as indexed by the ERN (Inzlicht, McGregor, Hirsh, & Nash, 2009, Psychological Science). Finally, in a recent EEG study, we found that goal-conflict caused an immediate increase in approach motivation, which then mediated a reduction in the ERN (Nash, Prentice, McGregor, Phills, & Inzlicht, in prep). This demonstrates that people engage approach motivation through intense conviction for cherished beliefs to regulate distress caused by goal-conflict.

Currently, I have begun to apply this neuropsychological model of defense to the psychology of social media. First, together with Dr. Kumar Yogeeswaran (University of Canterbury, Psychology) and Dr. Raazesh Sainudiin (University of Canterbury, Maths), we are examining the ideological dynamics of Twitter networks for major figures in the 2016 US presidential election (Donald Trump, Hillary Clinton, Bernie Sanders, Paul Ryan, and Ted Cruz). Data collected during the election cycle will probe whether the same approach-related defensive processes drive support for political candidates. Second, in a recent EEG study, we found that receiving ‘likes’ on Instagram quells the anxiety elicited by social exclusion (i.e., Cyberball), as evidenced by muted ERPs related to conflict (the P300 to aversive white noise bursts), particularly for narcissistic individuals. This supports the idea that social media platforms can sometimes serve as an egoistic avenue for anxiety regulation.

Health and Well-being

Based on our work on distress and conflict, we also examine individual differences in distress and the consequences for health and well-being, For example, social connection and social support are seen as kinds of psychological cure-alls, routinely prescribed to reduce distress and boost wellbeing. Connection and social support are indeed broadly helpful in reducing negative emotions and promoting resilience. Unfortunately, research and treatments commonly assume ‘one-size-fits-all’ and fail to account for the fact that people are extremely heterogeneous in terms of vulnerability to and regulation of distress. This might explain why social support and connection can sometimes have negative effects on mood, personal optimism, and coping success. Moreover, these negative effects appear specific to insecure people. Social connection and support appear to have the opposite effect for the insecure—the very people most in need of relief. A better understanding of reactions to distress and the underlying neuropsychological processes amongst the insecure would allow for person-centered interventions more capable of reducing distress and limiting costly defensive-coping behaviors for those most in need. 

Moral Decision-Making

Despite many years of fruitful work on the psychology of morality, dedicated empirical scrutiny on immorality has ben scant. Even less attention has been paid to the motivational factors that spur on or silence immorality—i.e., selfish actions that harm others or the community, including cheating, stealing, or lying. What drives such immorality? And what might neutralize immorality and foster moral action. We suggest that immorality is often driven by a kind of reactive egoism to distressing events. Simply put, distress tells us something is wrong and the aversive state compels us to seek relief. As my prior research has shown, unfortunately, relief often comes in the form of intense, close-minded pursuit of goals, beliefs, and ideals. This reactive egoism initiates the reward-focused ‘tunnel-vision’ that does quell distress, but also blinds people to others’ perspectives. Consequently, people may become less likely to act appropriately and more likely to cheat, lie, steal, and ignore moral codes. I will examine the neuropsychological processes in reactive egoism and examine whether immoral behavior after distress can be silenced through self-control training, instilling social belongingness, and/or supplanting egoism with compassionate goals.